Audit-privilege laws: the right to know nothing? by Dahl, R
di-












L..Spheres of Influence * Audit-Privilege Laws
resulted from self-audits. The privilege
claim was denied by an administrative
hearing examiner, and the subsequent fed-
eral court action recently resulted in a set-
tlement in which the landfill operator
agreed to pay for residents' health exami-
nations.
According to Altman, ifOhio had had
its audit-privilege law on the books a few
years earlier, the information that led to
the settlement would not have been avail-
able and the negotiated relief for the resi-
dents who live near the landfill would
have been much more difficult to achieve.
Environmentalists and citizens groups
point to the Cincinnati case as a prime
instance of the threats to public health
that they contend are implicit in audit-
privilege laws. That is, if companies can
keep secret the information that they
gather in their own environmental audits,
how are citizens to know of actual or
potential environmental threats in their
communities?
Industry contends that companies have
been unfairly harmed by lawsuits that have
used information from self-audits, which
would not be available were it not for the
companies' initiative to be better environ-
mental managers. Thus, they argue, such
good-faith efforts by industry should be
rewarded by reasonable immunity and rea-
sonable privilege. Supporters ofaudit-priv-
ilege laws maintain that these laws encour-
age more audits and more disclosures of
regulatory violations because ofthe greatly
reduced chances that audit findings will
result in penalties.
The problem with this argument is
that it may not be true. A recent study by
the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) found no basis for
industry's argument that audit laws result
in more or better environmental audits.
Last year, the NCSL conducted telephone
interviews with 988 manufacturing facili-
ties and with environmental regulatory
agencies and offices ofattorneys general in
28 states in an effort to determine the
effects of these laws. What the NCSL
found was that the level ofaudit activity in
the states that have audit-privilege or
immunity laws was no different from that
in the states without them. Furthermore,
the NCSL reported, companies in states
with the laws were no more likely to dis-
close violations than companies in states
without them.
"What the NCSL study suggests to
me," says Nancy K. Stoner, director ofthe
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) Office of Planning and Policy
Analysis, "is that the premises underlying
those laws are flawed."
A Growing Net ofSecrecy
The first state to pass an audit-privilege
law was Oregon in 1993, followed closely
by Colorado. To Ross Vincent, chair of
the Sierra Club National Environmental
Quality Strategy Team, the first bills
reflected "a very logical and highly pre-
dictable response by company lawyers" in
answer to several trends.
During the 1980s and the Reagan
administration, the concept of the govern-
ment as enforcer of environmental laws
gave way under political pressure to that of
government as a more benign regulator. At
the same time, some companies striving to
comply with the ever-growing complexities
ofenvironmental laws and regulations dis-
covered the wisdom of proactive environ-
mental audits in order to preempt potential
regulatory violations.
"In the process of doing compliance
work with companies, EPA began to find
out about these audits," Vincent says.
"They acquired them either voluntarily or
under duress and used them to evaluate
what a company was actually doing. EPA
began to realize that there was significant
information about enforcement-related
activity-compliance issues-that they
were finding in these audit reports that was
not being captured by [the agency's]
reporting requirements."
What the EPA was finding, Vincent
says, was that their own reporting require-
ments were missing violations that were
showing up as a result ofaudit reports. "So
in their infinite wisdom, rather than beef
up their reporting requirements so that
they would begin to capture some of the
information that was showing up in the
audits but not in their routine reporting,"
he says, "EPA decided instead to take the
voluntary approach and encourage compa-
nies to do audits and to fix their violations
while doing nothing to improve the
mandatory reporting requirements. When
that began to happen and the company
lawyers got hold of that message, they
immediately began raising self-incrimina-
tion questions. That was the beginning of
the audit-privilege movement.
While industrial observers might agree
with Vincent's historical assessment, they
would argue that acompany's own self-gen-
erated audit information deserves legal pro-
tection. "Cases have been brought in which
a conviction was made easier because ofthe
company's audit report, filed away only for
an investigator to find years later, or a large
fine was demanded based on the company's
self-disclosed violation following an audit,"
wrote San Diego lawyer Mary L. Walker,
who served in the Department of Energy
and as an assistant attorney general during
the Reagan administration, in an article in
California Manufacturer. "And then, too,"
she wrote, "we recognized that the underly-
ing 'facts' in an audit report are not protect-
ed, even if the audit is prepared under an
attorney's direction." In other words, indus-
try argued, why should "good" companies
who report their deficiencies be penalized
while "bad" companies who do not report
go free?
The argument was compelling, and
between 1994 and 1998 there was a flurry
oflegislative activity around the country as
industry-backed audit-privilege bills usual-
ly-but not always-won out over those
that opposed audit secrecy. But today, with
25 states having adopted audit-privilege
and audit-immunity laws, observers on
both sides of the issue say such legislative
activity has peaked. Following a lively hear-
ing before the House Commerce
Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations in March 1998 where
opponents of audit privileges apparently
held the upper hand, Capitol Hill has
heard little on the subject this year.
Peeling Back the Covers
Some citizens groups, as well as the EPA,
continue to criticize the worst of the
audit-privilege laws as measures that pro-
vide too deep a refuge in which potential
polluters can safely hide with the full
backing of the law. Most audit-privilege
laws contain two main components:
immunity from prosecution for violations
that are discovered during an audit and for
which the company demonstrates intent
to remedy, and privilege-or secrecy-for
the audit information.
"The immunity is not so offensive,"
says Altman. "We don't like immunity in
the health and safety community, but at
least you know what it is that you're get-
ting immunity for-and what they're get-
ting immunity from is governmental pros-
ecution to one extent or another. The
privilege is the problem because the privi-
lege is what authorizes secrecy about the
underlying facts about pollution."
Individual state laws define the kinds of
information that can be considered privi-
leged and the conditions that must be met
for immunity.
Audit-privilege laws run counter not
only to EPA-administered federal environ-
mental regulations, which require full disclo-
sure of environmental compliance informa-
tion, but to community right-to-know laws
as well. Attorney Sanford Lewis, director of
the Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
Industries in Boston, Massachusetts, sarcas-
tically refers to audit-privilege statutes as
"right-to-know-nothing laws."
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Stoner says that while audit-privilege
laws usually exempt from privilege status
information that companies are required to
report to state environmental agencies
(such as the amounts ofchemicals they use,
release, recycle, and transfer), such laws do
interfere with the ability ofcommunities to
obtain other kinds of information from
neighboring facilities. For example, she
says, "Neighbors of a facility may see dark
plumes coming out of [a facility] or some
kind of unusual discharge into the water
and have reason to believe there's a prob-
lem, but they and state and local law
enforcers will be unable to get access to a
whole class of information that may be
necessary to determine the cause of the
problem, the extent of any environmental
harm, and the steps necessary to fix it."
Stoner andAltman contend that "privi-
lege" has long been a narrowly defined legal
term that has traditionally been held to a
high standard as an exception to general
rules of disclosure. "Even executive privi-
lege has been beaten back in favor of dis-
closure," Altman says. "National security
was a blanket at federal facilities for years.
It kept secret environmental contamination
that we're now spending billions ofdollars
to deal with because the blanket's been
thrown back. Even national security can't
be used today to get privilege. And under
lawyer-client privilege, you can't hide the
facts about pollution." Compared with
these other privilege rationales, they argue,
the rationale for audit privilege falls well
short ofmeeting that standard.
In assessing audit-privilege laws, Altman
is evaluating something he sees as a
Machiavellian creation replete with catch-
22s. In order to initiate legal action against a
potential polluter, plaintiffs must have access
to information that is secret from everybody,
including government regulators. "In many
of these states, [the laws have] created a
superprivilege," he says. "[Companies] can
correct or not correctwhat [they] find. They
can say, 'By the way, we have this problem,
here's howwe define it, and wewant immu-
nity because we fixed it or made it better.' It
doesn't necessarily mean they cleaned it up
or tooksteps to make it better."
Texas's Experience
The Texas Chemical Council, an Austin-
based trade organization, lobbied hard for
passage of Texas's audit-privilege and
immunity statute, which was signed into
law in 1995. Jim Woodrick, the current
president of the council, contends that
industry backs the law because "we have a
pretty strong belief that it's important to
operate our plant sites in a manner that
protects the environment."
Woodrickalso says that industry likes the
law because it protects them from lawsuits.
In order to deal with increasing environmen-
tal regulations, companies began conducting
their own audits. "But pretty soon we got to
the era of litigation and trial lawyers and
environmentalists who were looking for ways
to basically get at our business, and those
reports began to be subpoenaed," he says.
"As a result, to use asimple phrase, we began
to clam up as an industry because ofthe lia-
bilities that we were creating for ourselves
when we went out and did these audits,
which we knew were good things to do. So
one of the main reasons we were interested
in this kind oflegislation is because it is legis-
lation that encourages audits. It encourages
improved performance."
The Texas law lays out a series ofsteps
that auditors must take in order to achieve
immunity. "Basically," says Paul Sarahan,
litigation director for the Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission
(TNRCC), "you've got to tell us that
you're going to do the audit, then you do
the audit and discover what violations are
out there, make a disclosure to us about
those violations that you're going to claim
immunity for, and then give us the correc-
tive action that you're going to take and
the timetable that that's going to be done
in. Then when you do all the corrective
action we review it and, assuming every-
thing's okay, we send you a letter and tell
you that you are immune from penalty for
those violations."
While immunity depends on satisfying
a series of criteria, privilege is assumed in
the law. "[Privilege] provides the means by
which a facility can feel secure in doing a
thorough and critical analysis oftheir com-
pliance without worrying about citizens
groups and everybody else coming and get-
ting that information," says Scottie Aplin,
the TNRCC's audit coordinator.
While Woodrick says he's sure that
more chemical manufacturers are doing
audits because of the law, Aplin says it's
hard to say because there's no baseline for
measurement. "Nobody tracks the number
ofaudits," he says, "so to say that we have
more audits as a result of this statute is a
little difficult. By the same token, it's
extremely difficult, I think, to say that the
law has not had an effect. I think that aside
from trying to encourage audits-and most
of us here believe that the program does
encourage that-it also provides for imme-
diate resolution ofviolations, which under
normal circumstances you may not have
because many facilities will choose never to
disclose a violation and never work with
the agency to resolve that violation as a
result."
"Many of the violations that are being
disclosed are ones that wouldn't necessarily
be discovered in a standard inspection,"
Woodrick adds. "That's an additional bene-
fit ofthe program: getting people to analyze
their facility. They're the ones who know it
best because they're the ones who are there
24 hours a day. [The possibility ofimmuni-
ty] gives them an incentive to disclose as
many of the violations as possible and cor-
rect those violations as quickly as possible."
Keeping Secrets in the Future
Both supporters and opponents of audit-
privilege laws agree that the issue has cooled
in the last year, possibly because, for the
most part, states have weighed in on the
issue either for or against. Vincent says that
he's not gotten a single call that any legisla-
ture is considering such a law. According to
the NCSL, no additional states had added
audit-privilege laws as ofJune of this year,
and only two did lastyear.
In some states, however, citizens groups
are continuing to oppose existing laws.
Specifically, groups in Colorado and Ohio
have filed petitions to the EPA contending
that because the EPA authorizes state envi-
ronmental programs that must meet federal
minimum standards, and because audit-
privilege and immunity laws restrict states'
abilities to enforce those standards, the
agency should therefore withdraw the
authority it has granted to the states. The
Colorado petition was filed two years ago,
and according to Vincent, signers had held
back from pressuring the EPA, hoping that
Colorado legislators would see the pitfalls
of the state's existing law and allow its
fifth-year sunset to occur this past spring.
The legislature, however, voted to keep
the law by removing the sunset clause. So
Colorado's petition backers are renewing
their effort to force the EPA to withdraw
its authority. "EPA is very reluctant to
withdraw [authority] for those programs
[from the states] because then it has to
come up with the manpower and the
resources to manage them," Vincent says.
"We're not anxious to see [environmental]
programs withdrawn, but neither are we
interested in seeing them undermined. The
state of Colorado is playing hardball.
They're basically painting EPA as the cul-
prit. . . . At some point, EPA is going to
have to fish or cut bait. If they withdraw
the state program, there's a chance ofcon-
gressional backlash that they need to be
concerned about. But before that day
comes, we hope we can persuade the state
to make changes in the law that at least get
rid ofits most abusive provisions."
The EPA opposes audit-privilege laws
as a matter of policy. At the same time,
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however, the agency encourages voluntary
environmental auditing and other forms of
self-policing through its own audit policy,
which, instead of granting privilege or
immunity for violation disclosures, offers
reduced orwaived penalties for prompt dis-
closures and corrective actions. Since its
inception in January 1996, the EPA's audit
policy has resulted in 485 violation disclo-
sures from 1,906 facilities. According to a
report by Steven A. Herman, assistant
administrator of the EPA's Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
199 companies received reduced or waived
penalties (many of the remaining cases are
still under review).
"We've always viewed [our audit policy]
as an alternative approach," Stoner says.
"It's one that doesn't have the negative
effects that audit-privilege laws have on the
public right to know or on the law-enforce-
ment agencies' ability to obtain information
on the cause of the violations and the
actions necessary to correct them and pre-
vent their recurrence." According to Stoner,
the EPA has worked with some states to
modify their audit-privilege statutes so that
the audit privilege is trumped by the infor-
mation-gathering authority that a state
must have in order to receive federal autho-
rization of an environmental program. For
example, she says, "Ifa state is investigating
an oil spill, it can get documents even if
they're in something that someone calls an
audit report or a self-evaluation so that they
can remedythe problem."
According to the EPA, one avenue for
legal action against suspected polluters in
states with audit-privilege laws is to seek
action in federal court. Altman, however,
argues that federal judges have the discre-
tion to apply state audit-privilege laws if
the matter is a state issue. "There are more
and more federal judges now that are
inclined to do so," he says.
Besides, he argues, in order to bring an
action in any court, a plaintiff must have
access to information, possibly the kind of
information that would come from an
environmental audit and therefore be off-
limits for discovery. "The beauty of the
secrecy provided by audit-privilege laws,"
he says, "is that you've got to know what
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